Abstract-A novel unified Bayesian framework for network detection is developed, under which a detection algorithm is derived based on random walks on graphs. The algorithm detects threat networks using partial observations of their activity, and is proved to be optimum in the Neyman-Pearson sense. The algorithm is defined by a graph, at least one observation, and a diffusion model for threat. A link to well-known spectral detection methods is provided, and the equivalence of the random walk and harmonic solutions to the Bayesian formulation is proven. A general diffusion model is introduced that utilizes spatiotemporal relationships between vertices, and is used for a specific space-time formulation that leads to significant performance improvements on coordinated covert networks. This performance is demonstrated using a new hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel introduced to simulate random covert networks with realistic properties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
N ETWORK detection is the objective in many diverse graph analytic applications, ranging from graph partitioning, mesh segmentation, manifold learning, community detection [44] , network anomaly detection [10] , [30] , and the discovery of clandestine networks [32] , [43] , [52] , [56] , [70] . A new Bayesian approach to network detection is developed and analyzed in this paper, with specific application to detecting small, covert networks embedded within much larger background networks. The novel approach is based on a Bayesian probabilistic framework where the probability of threat is derived from an observation model and an a priori threat diffusion model. Specifically, observed threats from one or more vertices are propagated through the graph using a S. T. Smith, K. D. Senne, G. Bernstein, and S. Philips are with the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA 02420 USA (e-mail: stsmith@ll.mit.edu; edward.kao@ll.mit.edu; senne@ll.mit.edu; garrett.bernstein@ll.mit.edu).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSP.2014.2336613 model based on random walks represented as Markov chains with absorbing states. The resulting network detection algorithm is proved to be optimum in the Neyman-Pearson sense of maximizing the probability of detection at a fixed false alarm probability. In the specific case of space-time graphs with time-stamped edges, a model for threat diffusion yields the new space-time threat propagation algorithm, which is shown to be an optimal detector for covert networks with coordinated activity. Network detectors are analyzed using both a stochastic framework of random walks on the graph and a probabilistic framework. The two frameworks are shown to be equivalent, providing an original, unified approach for Bayesian network detection. Performance for a variety of Bayesian network detection algorithms is shown with both a stochastic blockmodel and a new hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel (HMMB) introduced to simulate random covert networks with realistic properties.
Using insights from algebraic graph theory, the connection between this unified framework and other spectral-based network detection methods [18] , [22] , [44] is shown, and the two approaches are contrasted by comparing their different optimality criteria based on detection probability and subgraph connectivity properties. The random walk framework provides a connection with many other well-known graph analytic methods that may also be posed in this context [7] , [11] , [15] , [34] , [46] , [54] , [62] . In contrast to other research on network detection, rather than using a sensor network to detect signals [3] , [13] , [30] , the signal of interest in this paper is the network. In this sense the paper is also related to work on socalled manifold learning methods [8] , [10] , [16] , although the network to be detected is a subgraph of an existing network, and therefore the methods described here belong to a class of network anomaly detection [10] as well as maximumlikelihood methods for network detection [21] .
Threat network discovery is predicated on the existence of observations of network relationships. Detection of network communities is most likely to be effective if the communities exhibit high levels of connection activity. The covert networks of interest in this paper exist to accomplish nefarious, illegal, or terrorism goals, while "hiding in plain sight" [70] . Covert networks necessarily adopt operational procedures to remain hidden and robustly adapt to losses of parts of the network [9] , [52] , [61] , [66] . This paper's major contributions are organized into a description of the novel approach to Bayesian network detection in Section III, and showing and comparing detection performance using simulations of realistic networks in Section IV.
Fundamental new results are established in Theorems 1-3, which prove a maximum principal for threat propagation, provide a nonnegative basis for the principal invariant subspace, and prove the equivalence between the probabilistic and stochastic realization approaches of threat propagation. The Neyman-Pearson optimality of threat propagation is established in Theorem 4.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Notation
A graph G = (V, E) is defined by two sets, the vertices V , and the edges
2 denotes the set of 2-element subsets of V [17] . For example, the sets V = { 1, 2, 3 }, E = {1, 2}, {2, 3} describe a simple graph with undirected edges between vertices 1 and 2, and 2 and 3: 1 −− 2 −− 3 . The order and size of G are defined to be #V and #E, respectively. A subgraph G ⊆ G is a graph (V , E ) with V ⊆ V and E ⊆ E. If E contains all edges in E with both endpoints in V , then G = G[V ] is the induced subgraph of V . The adjacency matrix A = A(G) of G is the {0, 1}-matrix with a ij = 1 iff { i, j } ∈ E. In the example, A = T is the vector of all ones. The neighborhood N (u) = v : {u, v} ∈ E of a vertex u ∈ V is the set of vertices adjacent to u, or equivalently, the set of nonzero elements in the u-th row of A. The vertex space V (G) of G is the vector space of functions f : V → {0, 1}.
A directed graph G σ is defined by an orientation map σ : [V ] 2 → V × V (the ordered Cartesian product of V with itself) in which the first and second coordinates are called the initial and terminal vertices, respectively. A strongly connected graph is a connected graph for which a directed path exists between any two vertices. The incidence matrix B = B(G σ ) of G σ is the (0, ±1)-matrix of size #V -by-#E with B ie = ±1, if i is an terminal/initial vertex of σ(e), and 0 otherwise. For example, the directed graph 1 ←− 2 −→ 3 has incidence matrix B = . The unnormalized Laplacian matrix or Kirchhoff matrix Q of a graph, the (normalized) Laplacian matrix L, and the generalized or asymmetric Laplacian matrix Ł are, respectively,
In the example, Ł is immediately recognized as a discretization of the second derivative −d 2 /dx 2 , i.e. the negative of the
/∂y 2 + · · · that appears in physical applications. The connection between the Laplacian matrices and physical applications is made through Green's first identity, a link that explains many theoretical and performance advantages of the normalized Laplacian over the Kirchhoff matrix across applications [14] , [64] , [67] , [68] .
Solutions to Laplace's equation on a graph are directly connected to random walks or discrete Markov chains on the vertices of the graph, which provide stochastic realizations for harmonic problems. A (right) stochastic matrix T of a graph is a nonnegative matrix such that T1 = 1. This represents a state transition matrix of a random walk on the graph with transition probability t ij of jumping from vertex v i to vertex v j . The Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees if T is irreducible (i.e. G is strongly connected) then there exists a stationary probability distribution p v on V such that p T T = p T [26] , [28] . Random walk realizations can be used to describe the solution to harmonic boundary value problems, e.g. equilibrium thermodynamics [47] , [51] , in which given values are proscribed at specific "boundary" vertices.
B. Network Detection
Network detection is a special class of the more general graph partitioning (GP) problem in which the binary decision of membership or non-membership for each graph vertex must be determined. Indeed, the network detection problem for a graph G of order N results in a 2 N -ary multiple hypothesis test over the vertex space V (G), and, when detection optimality is considered, an optimal test involves partitioning the measurement space into 2 N regions yielding a maximum probability of detection (PD). This NP-hard combinatoric problem is computationally and analytically intractable. In general, network detection methods invoke various relaxation approaches to avoid the NP-hard network detection problem. The new Bayesian threat propagation approach taken in this paper is to greatly simplify the general 2 N -ary multiple hypothesis test by applying the random walk model and treating it as N independent binary hypothesis tests. This approach is related to existing network detection methods by posing an optimization problem on the graph-e.g. threat propagation maximizes PD-and through solutions to Laplace's equation on graphs. Because many network detection algorithms involve such solutions, a key fact is that the constant vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1)
T is in the kernel of the Laplacian,
This constant solution does not distinguish between vertices at all, a deficiency that may be resolved in a variety of ways. Efficient graph partitioning algorithms and analysis appeared in the 1970s with Donath and Hoffman's eigenvaluebased bounds for graph partitioning [18] and Fiedler's connectivity analysis and graph partitioning algorithm [22] which established the connection between a graph's algebraic properties and the spectrum of its Kirchhoff Laplacian matrix Q = D − A [Eq. (1)]. Spectral methods solve the graph partitioning problem by optimizing various subgraph connectivity properties. Similarly, the threat propagation algorithm developed here in Section III optimizes the probability of detecting a subgraph for a specific Bayesian model. Though the optimality criteria for spectral methods and threat propagation are different, all these network detection methods must address the fundamental problem of avoiding the trivial solution of constant harmonic functions on graphs. Threat propagation avoids this problem by using observation vertices and a priori probability of threat diffusion (Section III-A). Spectral methods take a complementary approach to avoid this problem by using an alternate optimization criterion that depends upon the network's topology.
The cut size of a subgraph-the number of edges necessary to remove to separate the subgraph from the graph-is quantified by the quadratic form s T Qs, where s = (±1, . . . , ±1)
T is a ±1-vector who entries are determined by subgraph membership [50] . Minimizing this quadratic form over s, whose solution is an eigenvalue problem for the graph Laplacian, provides a network detection algorithm based on the model of minimal cut size. However, there is a paradox in the application of spectral methods to network detection: the smallest eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian λ 0 (Q) = 0 corresponds to the eigenvector 1 constant over all vertices, which fails to discriminate between subgraphs. Intuitively this degenerate constant solution makes sense because the two subgraphs with minimal (zero) subgraph cut size are the entire graph itself (s ≡ 1), or the null graph (s ≡ −1). This property manifests itself in many well-known results from complex analysis, such as the maximum principle.
Fiedler showed that if rather the eigenvector ξ 1 corresponding to the second smallest eigenvalue λ 1 (Q) of Q is used (many authors write λ 1 = 0 and λ 2 rather than the zero offset indexing λ 0 = 0 and λ 1 used here), then for every nonpositive constant c ≤ 0, the subgraph whose vertices are defined by the threshold ξ 1 ≥ c is necessarily connected. This algorithm is called spectral detection. Given a graph G, the number λ 1 (Q) is called the Fiedler value of G, and the corresponding eigenvector ξ 1 (Q) is called the Fiedler vector. Completely analogous with comparison theorems in Riemannian geometry that relate topological properties of manifolds to algebraic properties of the Laplacian, many graph topological properties are tied to its Laplacian. For example, the graph's diameter D and the minimum degree d min provide lower and upper bounds for the Fiedler value λ 1 (Q): 4/(nD) ≤ λ 1 (Q) ≤ n/(n − 1)·d min [41] . This inequality explains why the Fiedler value is also called the algebraic connectivity: the greater the Fiedler value, the smaller the graph diameter, implying greater graph connectivity. If the normalized Laplacian L of Eq. (2) is used, the corresponding inequality involving the generalized eigenvalue
Because in practice spectral detection with its implicit assumption of minimizing the cut size oftentimes does not detect intuitively appealing subgraphs, Newman introduced the alternate criterion of subgraph "modularity" for subgraph detection [44] . Rather than minimize the cut size, Newman proposes to maximize the subgraph connectivity relative to background graph connectivity, which yields the quadratic maximization problem max s s T Ms, where M = A − V −1 dd T is Newman's modularity matrix, A is the adjacency matrix, (d) i = d i is the degree vector, and V = 1 T d is the graph volume [44] . Newman's modularity-based graph partitioning algorithm, also called community detection, involves thresholding the values of the principal eigenvector of M. Miller et al. [38] - [40] also consider thresholding arbitrary eigenvectors of the modularity matrix, which by the Courant minimax principle biases the Newman community detection algorithm to smaller subgraphs, a desirable property for many applications. They also outline an approach for exploiting observations within the spectral framework [38] .
Other graph partitioning methods invoke alternate relaxation approaches that yield practical detection/partitioning algorithms such as semidefinite programming (SDP) [6] , [35] , [69] . A class of graph partitioning algorithms is based on infinite random walks on graphs [59] . Zhou and Lipowsky define proximity using the average distance between vertices [72] . Anderson et al. define a local version biased towards specific vertices [4] . Mahoney et al. develop a local spectral partitioning method by augmenting the quadratic optimization problem with a locality constraint and relaxing to a convex SDP [37] . An important dual to network detection is the problem of identifying the source of an epidemic or rumor using observations on the graph [53] , [54] . Another related problem is the determination of graph topologies for which epidemic spreading occurs [11] , [62] . The approach adopted in this paper has fundamentally different objectives and propagation models than the closely-related epidemiological problems. These problems focus on disease spreading to large portions of the entire graph, which arises because disease may spread from any infected neighbor-yielding a logical OR of neighborhood disease. Network detection focuses on discovering a subgraph most likely associated with a set of observed vertices, assuming random walk propagation to the observations-yielding an arithmetic mean of neighborhood threat. All of these methods are related to spectral partitioning through the graph Laplacian.
III. BAYESIAN NETWORK DETECTION
The Bayesian model developed here depends upon threat observation and propagation via random walks over both space and time, and the underlying probabilistic models that govern inference from observation to threat, then propagation of threat throughout the graph. Bayes' rule is used to develop a network detection approach for spatial-only, space-time, and hybrid graphs. The framework assumes a given Markov chain model for transition probabilities, and hence knowledge of the graph, and a diffusion model for threat. Neyman-Pearson optimality is developed in the context of network detection with a simple binary hypothesis, and it is proved that threat propagation is optimum in this sense.
The framework is sufficiently general to capture graphs formed by many possible relationships between entities, from simple graphs with vertices that represent a single type of entity, to bipartite or multipartite graphs with heterogeneous entities. For example, an email network is a bipartite graph comprised of two types of vertices: individual people and individual email messages, with edges representing a connection between people and messages. Without loss of generality, all entity types to be detected are represented as vertices in the graph, and their connections are represented by edges weighted by scalar transition probabilities.
Network detection is the problem of identifying a specific subgraph within a given graph G = (V, E). Assume that within G, a foreground or "threat" network V Θ exists defined by an (unknown) binary random variable:
The foreground or threat vertices are the set V Θ = { v : Θ v = 1}, and the foreground or threat network is the induced subgraph
. A network detector of the subgraph G Θ is a collection of binary hypothesis tests to decide which of the graph's vertices belong to the foreground vertices V Θ . Formally, a network detector is an element of the vertex space of G:
The correlation between a network detector φ and the actual threat network defined by the function Θ determines the detection performance of φ, measured using the detector's probability of detection (PD) and probability of false alarm (PFA). The PD and PFA of φ are the fraction of correct and incorrect foreground vertices determined by φ:
Observation models are now introduced and applied in the sequel to threat propagation models in the contexts of spatialonly graphs, space-time graphs whose edges have time stamps, and finally a hybrid graphs with edges of mixed type. Assume that there are C observed vertices { v b1 , . . . , v b C } ⊂ V at which observations are taken. In the resulting Laplacian problem, these are "boundary" vertices, and the rest are "interior." The simplest case involves scalar measurements; however, there is a straightforward extension to multidimensional observations.
Ideally, observation of a foreground and/or background vertices unequivocally determines whether the observed vertices lie in the foreground or background networks, i.e. given a foreground graph
and a foreground vertex v ∈ V Θ , an observation vector z evaluated at v would yield z(v) = 1, and z evaluated at a background vertex v ∈ VΘ would yield z(v ) = 0. In general, it is assumed that the observation z(v) at v and the threat Θ v at v are not statistically independent, i.e. f z(v) | Θ v = f z(v) for probability density f , so that there is positive mutual information between z(v) and Θ v . Bayes' rule for determining how likely a vertex is to be a foreground member or not depends on the model linking observations to threat:
The simplest, ideal observation model equates threat with observation so that f ideal z(v) | Θ v = δ z(v)Θv in which δ ij is the Kronecker delta. Though the threat network hypotheses are being treated here independently at each vertex, this framework allows for more sophisticated global models that include hypotheses over two or more vertices.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the development of Bayesian methods of using measurements on a graph to determine the probability of threat on a graph in various contexts-spatial-only, space-timed, and the hybrid case-then showing that these methods are optimum in the NeymanPearson sense of maximizing the probability of detection at a given false alarm rate. The motivating problem is:
This problem is addressed by computing the probability of threat P (Θ v ) at all graph vertices from the measurements at observed vertices using an observation model and the application of Bayes' rule.
A. Spatial Threat Propagation
A spatial threat propagation algorithm is motivated and developed now, which will be used in the subsequent spacetime generalization, and will demonstrate the connection to spectral network detection methods. A vertex is declared to be threatening if the observed threat propagates to that vertex. We wish to compute the probability of threat
Implicit in Problem 1 is a coordinated threat network in which threat propagates via network connections, i.e. graph edges. For simplicity, probabilities conditioned on the observation z will be written
with an implied dependence on the observation vector z and the event Θ v = 1 expressed as Θ v .
To model the diffusion of threat throughout the graph, we introduce an a priori probability ψ v at each vertex v that represents threat diffusion at v. ψ v is the probability that threat propagates through vertex v to its neighbors, otherwise threat propagates to an absorbing "non-threat" state with probability 1 − ψ v . A threat diffusion event at v is represented by the {0, 1}-valued r.v. Ψ v :
Definition 5 The threat diffusion model of a graph G = (V, E) with observation z is given by the a priori {0, 1}-valued event Ψ v that threat Θ v propagates through v with probability ψ v .
Threat propagation on the graph from the observed vertices to all other vertices is defined as an average over all random walks between vertices and the observations. A single random walk between v and an observed vertex v bc is defined by the sequence
with endpoints v w1 = v and v w L = v bc , comprised of L steps along vertices v w l ∈ V . The probabilities for each step of the random walk are defined by the elements of the transition matrix t vu from vertex v to u, multiplied by the a priori probability ψ v that threat propagates through v. The assumption that G is strongly connected guarantees the existence of a walk between every vertex and every observation. Threat may be absorbed to the non-threat state with probability 1 − ψ vw l at each step. The simplest models for both the transition and a priori probabilities are uniform:
The implications of these simple models as well as more general weighted models will be explored throughout this section.
The indicator function
determines whether threat propagates along the walk or is absorbed into the non-threat state (the superscript '(l)' allows for the possibility of repeated vertices in the sequence). The definition of threat propagation is captured in three parts:
(1) a single random walk, walk v→v bc , with I walkv→v bc = 1 yields threat probability θ v bc at v; (2) the probability of threat averaged over all such random walks; (3) the random variable obtained by averaging the r.v. Θ v bc over all such random walks. Formally, Definition 6 (Threat Propagation). Let G = (V, E) be a strongly connected graph with threat probabilities
(1) For a random walk on G from v to observed vertex v bc with transition matrix T,
for all vertices v w l along the walk, then the threat propagation from v bc to v along walk v→v bc is defined to be θ v bc ; otherwise, the threat equals zero. (2) Threat propagation to vertex v is defined as the expectation of threat propagation to v along all random walks emanating from v,
where the kth walk terminates at the observed vertex v b c(k) . (3) Random threat propagation to vertex v is defined as the random variablē
v Single hop walk
Random walk
a.s. with independent draws Θ
of the observed threat. 
The random walk model is described using the distinct yet equivalent probabilistic and stochastic realization representations. The probabilistic representation describes the threat probabilities by a Laplacian system of linear equations, which amounts to equating threat at a vertex to an average of neighboring probabilities. In contrast, the stochastic realization representation presented below in Section III-A2 describes the evolution of a single random walk realization whose ensemble statistics are described by the probabilistic representation, presented next.
The probabilistic equation for threat propagation from the neighbors of a vertex v follows immediately from Definition 6 from first-step analysis, yielding the threat propagation equation:
which is simply the average of the neighboring threat probabilities weighted by transition probabilities t vu = (T) vu . Note that because Aθ ≥ θ, θ v is a subharmonic function on the graph [19] , [28] . In the simplest case of uniform transition probabilities, T = D −1 A and
Expressed in matrix-vector notation, Eqs. (13) and (14) become θ = ΨTθ and
where
is the diagonal matrix of a priori threat diffusion probabilities, T, D, and A are, respectively, the transition, degree, and adjacency matrices. The threat probabilities at the observed vertices v b1 , . . . , v b C are determined by the observation model of Definition 4, and threat probabilities at all other vertices are determined by solving Eq. (15), as with all Laplacian boundary value problems.
As seen in the spectral network detection methods in Section II-B, many network detection algorithms exploit properties of the graph Laplacian, and therefore must address the fundamental challenge posed by the implication of the maximum principle that harmonic functions are constant [19] in many important situations [Eq. (4)], and because the constant function does not distinguish between vertices, detection algorithms that rely only on solutions to Laplace's equation provide a futile approach to detection. If the boundary is constant, i.e. the probability of threat on all observed vertices is equal, then this is the probability of threat on every vertex in the graph. The later example is relevant in the practical case in which there a single observation. The maximum principle applies directly to threat propagation with uniform prior Ψ = I and uniform probability of threat p o on the observed vertices: Eqs. (15) are recognized as Laplace's equation, (I − T)θ = 0 or (I − D −1 A)θ = 0, whose solution is trivially θ = p o 1. Equivalently, from the stochastic realization point-of-view, the probability of threat on all vertices is the same because average over all random walks between any vertex to a boundary (observed) vertex is trivially the observed, constant probability of threat p o .
The following maximum principle establishes the existence of a unique non-negative threat probability on a graph given threat probabilities at observed vertices: Theorem 1 (Maximum Principle for Threat Propagation). Let G = (V, E) be a connected graph with positive probability of threat θ v b 1 , . . . , θ v b C at observed vertices v b1 , . . . , v b C and the a priori probability ψ v that threat propagates through vertex v. Then there exists a unique probability of threat θ v at all vertices such that θ v ≥ 0 and the maximum threat occurs at the observed vertices.
Proof: That θ v exists follows from the connectivity of G, and that it takes its maximum on the boundary follows immediately from Eq. (14) because the threat at all vertices is necessarily bounded above by their neighbors. Now prove that θ v is nonnegative by establishing a contradiction. Let θ m be the minimum of all θ v < 0. Because ψ m ≤ 1, Eq. (14) implies that θ m ≥ Avg[N (m)], the weighted average value of the neighbors of m. Therefore, there exists a neighbor n ∈ N (m) such that θ n ≤ θ m . But θ m is by assumption the minimum value. Therefore, θ n = θ m for all n ∈ N (m). Because G is connected, θ v ≡ θ m is constant for all unobserved vertices on G. Now consider the minimum threat θ i for which i ∈ N (b)
Therefore,
a contradiction. Therefore, the minimum value of θ v is nonnegative.
This theorem is intuitively appealing because it shows how nonuniform a priori probabilities ψ v yield a nonconstant and nonnegative threat on the graph; however, the theorem conceals the crucial additional "absorbing" state that allows threat to dissipate away from the constant solution. This slight defect will be corrected shortly when the equivalent stochastic realization Markov chain model is introduced. Models about the likelihood of threat at specific vertices across the graph are provided by the a priori probabilities ψ v , which as discussed above prevent the uninformative (yet valid) solution of constant threat across the graph given an observation of threat at a specific vertex.
A simple model for the a priori probabilities is degreeweighted threat propagation (DWTP),
in which threat is less likely to propagate through high-degree vertices. Another simple model sets the mean propagation length proportional to the graph's average path length l(G) yields length-weighted threat propagation (LWTP)
For almost-surely connected Erdős-Rényi graphs with p = n −1 log n, l(G) = (log n − γ)/ log log n + 1/2 and γ = 0.5772 . . . is Euler's constant [25] . A model akin to breadth-first search (BFS) sets the a priori probabilities to be inversely proportional to the Dijkstra distance from observed vertices, i.e.
Defining the generalized Laplacian operator
the threat propagation equation Eq. (15) written as
connects the generalized asymmetric Laplacian matrix of with threat propagation, the solution of which itself may be viewed as a boundary value problem with the harmonic operator Ł ψ . Given observations at vertices v b1 , . . . , v b C , the harmonic threat propagation equation is
where the generalized Laplacian have been permuted so that observed vertices are in the 'b' blocks (the "boundary"), unobserved vertices are in 'i' blocks (the "interior"), and the observation vector θ b is given. The harmonic threat is the solution to Eq. (24),
Eq. (24) is directly analogous to Laplace's equation ∆ϕ = 0 given a fixed boundary condition. As discussed in the next subsection and Section II-B, the connection between threat propagation and harmonic graph analysis also provides a link to spectral-based methods for network detection. In practice, the highly sparse linear system of Eq. (25) may be solved by simple repeated iteration of Eq. (13), or using the biconjugate gradient method, which provides a practical computational approach that scales well to graphs with thousands of vertices and thousands of time samples in the case of space-time threat propagation, resulting in graphs of order ten million or more. In practice, significantly smaller subgraphs are encountered in applications such as threat network discovery [56] , for which linear solvers with sparse systems are extremely fast.
2) Stochastic Realization Approach:
The stochastic realization interpretation of the Bayesian threat propagation equations (13) is that the probability of threat for one random walk from v to the observed vertex v bc is
and the probability of threat θ v at v equals the threat probability averaged over all random walks emanating from v. This is equivalent to an absorbing Markov chain with absorbing states [49] at which random walks terminate. The absorbing vertices for the threat diffusion model are the C observed vertices, and an augmented state reachable by all unobserved vertices representing a transition from threat to non-threat with probability 1 − ψ v . The (N + 1)-by-(N + 1) transition matrix for the Markov chain corresponding to threat propagation equals
in which G and H are defined by the block partition
with ' * ' denoting unused blocks, and ψ N −C = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ N −C ) T is the vector of a priori threat diffusion probabilities from 1 to N − C. The observed vertices v b1 , . . . , v b C are assigned to indices N − C + 1, . . . , N , and the augmented "non-threat" state is assigned to index N + 1.
According to this stochastic realization model, the threat at a vertex for any single random walk that terminates at an absorbing vertex is given by the threat level at the terminal vertex, with the augmented "non-threat" vertex assigned a threat level of zero; the threat is determined by this result averaged over all random walks. Ignoring the a priori probabilities, this is also precisely the stochastic realization model for equilibrium thermodynamics and, in general, solutions to Laplace's equation [47] , [51] .
As in Eq. (4), the uniform vector (N +1) −1 1 N +1 is the left eigenvector of T because T is a right stochastic matrix, i.e. T·1 = 1. For an irreducible transition matrix of a strongly connected graph, the Perron-Frobenius theorem [26] , [28] guarantees that this eigenvalue is simple and that the constant vector is the unique invariant eigenvector corresponding to λ = 1, a trivial solution that, as usual, poses a fundamental problem for network detection. However, neither version of the Perron-Frobenius theorem applies to the transition matrix T of an absorbing Markov chain because T is not strictly positive, as required by Perron, nor is T irreducible, as required by Frobenius-the absorbing states are not strongly connected to the graph.
To guarantee the existence of nonnegative threat propagating over the graph, we require a generalization of the PerronFrobenius theorem for reducible nonnegative matrices of the form found in Eq. (27) . The following theorem introduces a new version of Perron-Frobenius that establishes the existence of a nonnegative basis for the principal invariant subspace of a reducible nonnegative matrix.
Theorem 2 (Perron-Frobenius for a Reducible Nonnegative Matrix). Let T be a reducible, nonnegative, order n matrix of canonical form,
such that the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of Q is less than unity, |λ max (Q)| < 1, and rank R = r. Then the maximal eigenvalue of T is unity with multiplicity r and nondefective. Furthermore, there exists a nonnegative matrix
of rank r such that
i.e. the columns of E span the principal invariant subspace of T.
The proof follows immediately by construction and a straightforward computation involving the partition E = E1 E2
with the choice E 2 = I r , resulting in the nonnegative solution to Eq. (31), 
As is well-known [49] , the hitting probabilities of a random walk from an unobserved vertex to an observed vertex are given by the matrix U = (I − G) −1 H; therefore, an equivalent definition of threat probability θ v from Eq. (32) is the probability that a random walk emanating from v terminates at an observed vertex, conditioned on the probability of threat over all observed vertices:
We have thus proved the following theorem establishing the equivalence between the probabilistic and stochastic realization approaches of threat propagation. This theorem will also provide a connection to the spectral method for network detection discussed in Section II-B.
B. Space-Time Threat Propagation
Many important network detection applications, especially networks based on vehicle tracks and computer communication networks, involve directed graphs in which the edges have departure and arrival times associated with their initial and terminal vertices. Space-Time threat propagation is used compute the time-varying threat across a graph given one or more observations at specific vertices and times [48] , [57] . In such scenarios, the time-stamped graph G = (V, E) may be viewed as a space-time graph G T = (V × T, E T ) where T is the set of sample times and
2 is an edge set determined by the temporal correlations between vertices at specific times. This edge set is application-dependent, but must satisfy the two constraints, (1) if u(t k ), v(t l ) ∈ E T then (u, v) ∈ E, and (2) temporal subgraphs (u, v), E T (u, v) between any two vertices u and v are defined by a tem-
2 . If the stronger, converse of property (1) 
, then if the graph G is irreducible, then so is the space-time graph G T . An example space-time graph is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The general models for spatial threat propagation provided in the preceding subsection will now be augmented to include dynamic models of threat propagation.
Given an observed threat at a particular vertex and time, we wish to compute the inferred threat across all vertices and all times. Given a vertex v, denote the threat at v and at time t ∈ R by the {0, 1}-valued stochastic process Θ v (t), with value zero indicating no threat, and value unity indicating a threat. As above, denote the probability of threat at v at t by
The threat state at v is modeled by a finite-state continuous time Markov jump process between from state 1 to state 0 with Poisson rate λ v . With this simple model the threat stochastic process Θ v (t) satisfies the Itô stochastic differential equation [60] ,
where N v (t) is a Poisson process with rate λ v defined for positive time, and simple time-reversal provides the model for negative times. Given an observed threat z = Θ v (0) = 1 at v at t = 0 so that θ V (0) = 1, the probability of threat at v under the Poisson process model (including time-reversal) is
This stochastic model provides a Bayesian framework for inferring, or propagating, threat at a vertex over time given threat at a specific time. The function
of Eq. (36) is called the space-time threat kernel and when combined with spatial propagation provides a temporal model E T for a space-time graph. A Bayesian model for propagating threat from vertex to vertex will provide a full space-time threat diffusion model and allow for the application of the optimum maximum likelihood test that will be developed in Section III-D. Propagation of threat from vertex to vertex is determined by interactions between vertices. Upon computation of the spacetime adjacency matrix, the spatial analysis of Section III-A applies directly to space-time graphs whose vertices are spacetime positions. The threat at vertex v at which a single interaction τ from vertex u arrives and/or departs at times t v τ and t u τ is determined by Eq. (36) and the (independent) event Ψ v (t) that threat propagates through v at time t: (38) from the threat probability at u to v. Discretizing time, the temporal matrix K uv τ for the discretized operator has the sparse form
where 0 represents an all-zero column, t k represents a vector of discretized time, and the discretized function K(t k − t v τ ) appears in the column corresponding to the discretized time at t u τ . Threat propagating from vertex v to u along the same interaction τ is given by the comparable expression θ u (t) = θ v (t 
[cf. Eq. (39)] where the nonzero column corresponds to t v τ . The sparsity of K uv τ and K vu τ will be essential for practical space-time threat propagation algorithms. The collection of all interactions determines a weighted space-time adjacency matrix A for the space-time graph G T . This is a matrix of order #V ·#T whose temporal blocks for interactions between vertices u and v equals,
Note that with the space-time threat kernel of Eq. (37), if G is irreducible, then so is G T . As with spatial-only threat propagation of Eq. (13), the space-time threat propagation equation is
in which θ is the (discretized) space-time vector of threat probabilities, A = (k vu;kl ) is the (weighted) spacetime adjacency matrix, and W = Diag(A·1) and Ψ = diag ψ 1 (t 1 ), . . . , ψ N (t #T ) are, respectively, the space-time diagonal matrices of the space-time vertex weights and a priori probabilities that threat propagates through each spatial vertex at a specific time. In contrast to the treatment of spatial-only threat propagation in Section III-A, the space-time graph is necessarily a directed graph, consistent with the asymmetric space-time adjacency matrix of Eq. (41) . By assumption, the graph G is irreducible, implying that the space-time graph G T is also irreducible. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies a well-defined solution to the space-time threat propagation equation of Eq. (42) for a set observations at specific vertices and times, v b1 (t b1 ), . . . , v b C (t b C ). Yet the Perron-Frobenius theorem for the space-time Laplacian Ł = I − W −1 A poses precisely the same detection challenge as with spatial-only propagation: if the a priori probabilities are constant and equal to unity, i.e. Ψ = I, and the observed probability of threat is constant, then the space-time probability of threat is also constant for all spatial vertices and all times, yielding a hopeless detection method.
However, the advantage of time-stamped edges is that the times can be used to detected temporally coordinated network activity-we seek to detect vertices whose activity is correlated with that of threat observed at other vertices. According to this model of threat networks, the a priori probability that a threat propagates through vertex v at time t k is determined by the Poisson process used to model the probability of threat as a function of time:
where d v is the spatial degree of vertex v, i.e. the number of interactions associated with a spatial vertex. If all interactions arrive/depart at the same time at v, then the a priori probability of threat diffusion is unity at this time, but different times reduce this probability according to the stochastic process for threat. Thus space-time threat propagation for coordinated activity is determined by the threat propagation equation,
in which D = diag d 1 I, . . . , d N I is the block-diagonal space-time matrix of (unweighted) spatial degrees and A is the weighted space-time adjacency matrix as in Eq. (42). This algorithm may also be further generalized to account for spatialonly a priori probability models such as the distance from ob- 
C. Hybrid Threat Propagation
The temporal kernels introduced for time-stamped edges in Section III-B are appropriate for network detection applications that involve time-stamped edges; however, there are many applications in which such time-stamped information is either unavailable, irrelevant, or uncertain. Ignoring small routing delays, computer network communication protocols occur essentially instantaneously, and text documents may describe relationships between sites independent of a specific timeframe. Integrating spatio-temporal relationships from multiple information sources necessitates a hybrid approach combining, where appropriate, the spatial-only capabilities of Section III-A with the space-time methods of Section III-B.
In situations such as computer communication networks in which the timescale of the relationship is much smaller than the discretized timescale, then connections from one vertex to another arrive at the same discretized time, and the temporal blocks for connections between vertices u and v replaces Eq. (41) and equals,
In situations such as time-independent references within text documents in which threat at any time at vertex u implies a threat at all times at vertex v, and vice versa, the temporal blocks for connections between vertices u and v equals,
i.e. a space-time clique between u and v. This equivalent the space-time model with Poisson rate λ = 0.
D. Neyman-Pearson Network Detection
Network detection of a subgraph within a graph G = (V, E) of order N is treated as N independent binary hypothesis tests to decide which of the graph's N vertices do not belong (null hypothesis H 0 ) or belong (hypothesis H 1 ) to the network. Maximizing the probability of detection (PD) for a fixed probability of false alarm (PFA) yields the NeymanPearson test involving the log-likelihood ratio of the competing hypotheses. We will derive this test in the context of network detection, which both illustrates the assumptions that ensure detection optimality, as well as indicates practical methods for computing the log-likelihood ratio test and achieving an optimal network detection algorithm. It will be seen that a few basic assumptions yield an optimum test that is equivalent to the Bayesian threat propagation algorithm developed in the previous section. If any part of the graph is unknown or uncertain, then the Markov transition probabilities may be treated as random variables and either marginalized out of the likelihood ratio, yielding Neyman-Pearson optimality in the average sense, or the maximum likelihood estimate may be used in the suboptimum generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [63] . We will not cover extensions to unknown parameters in this paper. The optimum test involves the graph Laplacian, which allows comparison of Neyman-Pearson testing to several other network detection methods whose algorithms are also related to the properties of the Laplacian.
An optimum hypothesis test is now derived for the presence of a network given a set of observations z according to the observation model of Definition 4. Optimality is defined in the Neyman-Pearson sense in which the probability of detection is maximized at a constant false alarm rate (CFAR) [63] . For the general problem of network detection of a subgraph within graph G of order N , the decision of which of the
T to choose involves a 2 N -ary multiple hypothesis test over the measurement space of the observation vector z, and an optimal test involves partitioning the measurement space into 2 N regions yielding a maximum PD. This NP-hard general combinatoric problem is clearly computationally and analytically intractable. However, Eq. (11) following Definition 6 guarantees that the threats at each vertex are independent random variables, allowing the general 2 N -ary multiple hypothesis test to be greatly simplified by treating it as N independent binary hypothesis tests at each vertex.
At each vertex v ∈ G and unknown threat Θ : V → {0, 1} across the graph , consider the binary hypothesis test for the unknown value Θ v ,
(vertex belongs to background)
(vertex belongs to foreground).
Given the observation vector z :
. . , C, the PD and PFA are given by the integrals PD = R f (z | Θ v = 1) dz and PFA = R f (z | Θ v = 0) dz, where R ⊂ M is the detection region in which observations are declared to yield the decision Θ v = 1, otherwise Θ v is declared to equal 0. The optimum Neyman-Pearson test uses the detection region R that maximizes PD at a fixed CFAR value PFA 0 , yielding the likelihood ratio (LR) test [63] ,
for some λ > 0. Likelihood ratio tests are also used for graph classification [36] . Finally, a simple application of Bayes' theorem to the harmonic threat
results in a threshold of the harmonic space-time threat propagation vector of Eq. (7), 
This establishes the detection optimality of harmonic spacetime threat propagation. Because the probability of detecting threat is maximized at each vertex, the probability of detection for the entire subgraph is also maximized, yielding an optimum NeymanPearson test under the simplification of treating the 2 N -ary multiple hypothesis testing problem as a sequence of N binary hypothesis tests. Summarizing, the probability of network detection given an observation z is maximized by computing f (Θ v | z) using a Bayesian threat propagation method and applying a simple likelihood ratio test, yielding the following theorem that equates threat propagation with the optimum Neyman-Pearson test. 
IV. MODELING AND PERFORMANCE
Evaluation of network detection algorithms may be approached from the perspectives of theoretical analysis or empirical experimentation. Theoretical performance bounds have only been accomplished for simple network models, i.e. cliques [23] , [33] , [42] or dense subgraphs [5] embedded within Erdős-Rényi backgrounds, and there are no theoretical results at all for more complex network models that characterize real-world networks [58] . If representative network data with truth is available, one may evaluate algorithm performance with specific data sets [71] . However, real-world data sets of covert networks with truth is unknown to the authors. Therefore, network detection performance evaluation must be conducted on simulated networks using generative models. We begin with a simple stochastic blockmodel [65] , explore this model's limitations, then introduce a new network model designed to address these defects while at the same time encompassing the characteristics of real-world networks [1] , [2] , [12] , [45] , [70] . Varying model parameters also yields insight on the dependence of algorithm performance on different network characteristics.
For each evaluation, we compare performance between the space-time threat propagation [STTP; Section III-B], breadthfirst search spatial-only threat propagation [BFS; Eq. (21)], and modularity-based spectral detection algorithm [SPEC] [40] . The performance metric is the standard receiver operating characteristic (ROC), which in the case of network detection is the probability of detection (i.e. the percentage of true foreground vertices detected) versus the probability of false alarms (i.e. the percentage of background vertices detected) as the detection threshold is varied.
A. Detection Performance On Stochastic Blockmodels 1) Stochastic Blockmodel Description: The stochastic blockmodel captures the sparsity of real-world networks and basic community structure [27] using a simple network framework [65] . For a graph of order N divided into K communities, the model is parameterized by a N -by-K {0, 1} membership matrix Π and a K-by-K probability matrix S that defines the probability of an edge between two vertices based upon their community membership. Therefore, the probability of an edge is determined by the off-diagonal terms of the matrix ΠSΠ T . By the classical result of Erdős-Rényi [20] , each community is almost surely connected if S kk > log N k /N k in which N k is the number of vertices in community k. We introduce the activity parameter r k ≥ 1 and set S kk = r k log N k /N k to adjust a community's density relative to its Erdős-Rényi connectivity threshold.
2) Experimental Setup and Results: The objective of this experiment is to quantify detection performance of a foreground network with varying activity given observations from a small fraction of its members. Fig. 3 illustrates the ROC Results are shown for both sparsely connected (r fg = 1.1) and moderately connected (r fg = 2) foreground networks. The simulations show that excellent ROC performance is achievable if temporal information is exploited (STTP) with highly coordinated foreground networks with sparse to moderate connectivity. Because of the use of temporal information, STTP outperforms BFS. Spectral methods, which are designed to detect highly connected networks perform poorly on sparse foreground networks, and improve as foreground network connectivity increases, especially in the low PFA region in which SPEC performs better than BFS threat propagation. This result is consistent with expectations and recent theoretical results for spectral methods applied to clique detection [5] , [42] . Continuous likelihood ratio tests possess ROC curves that are necessarily convex upwards [63] ; therefore, the ROCs for threat propagation algorithms applied to data generated from random walk propagation are necessarily convex. The results of Fig. 3 show both threat propagation and spectral methods applied to data generated from a stochastic blockmodel. Because the spectral detection algorithm is not associated with a likelihood ratio test, convexity of its ROC curves is not guaranteed-indeed, the spectral ROC curve with r fg = 2 is seen to be concave in the high PD region. All threat propagation ROC curves are observed to be convex, except for a small part of STTP with r fg = 1.1 near PD = 0.7. This slight concavity (about 2%) may be caused by model mismatch between the stochastic blockmodel and the random walk model, or statistical fluctuation of the Monte Carlo analysis (about 1.4% binomial distribution variance at PD = 0.7).
Of course, real-world networks are not perfectly coordinated, ideal Erdős-Rényi graphs. We will develop a novel, more realistic model in the next section to explore how more realistic networks with varying levels of foreground coordination affect the performance of space-time threat propagation.
B. Detection Performance on the Hybrid Mixed-Membership Blockmodel 1) Hybrid Mixed-Membership Blockmodel Description: Real-world networks display basic topological characteristics that include a power-law degree distribution (i.e. the "small world" property) [12] , mixed-membership-based community structure (i.e. individuals belong to multiple communities) [2] , [65] , and sparsity [44] . No one simple network model captures all these traits. For example, the stochastic blockmodel above provides sparsity and a rough community structure, but does not capture interactions through time, the power-law degree distribution, nor the reality that each individual may belong to multiple communities. The power-law models such as R-MAT [12] do not capture membership-based community structure, and mixed-membership stochastic blockmodels [2] does not capture power-law degree distribution nor temporal coordination. To capture all these characteristics of the real-world networks model, we propose a new parameterized generative model called the "hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel" (HMMB) that combines the features of these fundamental network models. The proposed model is depicted as the plate diagram in Fig. 4 .
The hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel is an aggregate of the following simpler models and their features: Erdős-Rényi for sparsity [20] , Chung-Lu for power-law degree distribution [1] , and mixed-membership stochastic blockmodel for community structure [2] . We model the number of interactions between any two individuals (i.e. edge weights) as Poisson random variables. Each interaction receives a timestamp through a coordination model. As above, let N be the order of the graph, and let K be the number of communities. Each individual (i.e. vertex) divides its membership among the K communities (i.e. mixed membership), and the fraction in which an individual participates among the different communities is determined by L distinct lifestyles. The rate λ ij of interactions between vertices i and j is given by the product
where the first term I S ij is the (binary) indicator function drawn from the stochastic blockmodel described in Section IV-A, the second term λ i λ j / k λ k is the Chung-Lu model with pervertex expected degrees λ i , and the third term z T i→j Bz j→i is the mixed-membership stochastic blockmodel with K-by-K block matrix B that determines the intercommunity interaction strength, and z i→j is a {0, 1}-valued K-vector that indicates which community membership that vertex i assumes when interacting with vertex j.
The mixed-membership K-vector π i specifies the fraction that individual vertex i divides its membership among the K communities so that 1 T π i ≡ 1. Each vertex is assigned, via the {0, 1}-valued L-vector l i , to one of L "lifestyles" each with an expected membership distribution given by the L-by-K matrix X. The membership distribution π i is determined by a Dirichlet random draw using the K-vector l T X. The lifestyle vector l i is determined from a multinomial random draw using the L-vector φ as the probability of belonging to each lifestyle. Similarly, for each interaction, the community indicator vector z i→j is determined from a multinomial random draw using the K-vector π i as the probability of belonging to each community. The expected vertex degrees λ i are determined from a power-law random draw using the exponent α. The parameter matrices S and B are fixed.
Finally, intracommunity coordination is achieved by the nonnegative K-vector γ, a Poisson parameter of the average number of coordinated events at each vertex within a specific community. Smaller values of γ k correspond to higher levels of coordination in community k because there are fewer event times from which to choose. A community-dependent Poisson random draw determines the integer number of event times within each community, which are then drawn uniformly over the time extent of interest. An edge between vertices i and j is assigned two random event timestamps based on the community indicator vectors z i→j and z j→i .
2) Experimental Setup and Results: The objective of this experiment is to quantify detection performance with varying coordination of a realistic foreground network operating within a realistic background. We use eleven "lifestyles" spanning ten communities, with two lifestyles designated as foreground and all others as background.
The foreground network's coordination varies from γ fg = 1 (i.e. highly coordinated activity at a single time, consistent with the tactic used by covert networks to mitigate their exposure to discovery) to γ fg = 24 (i.e. less coordination). Each member of the covert foreground network is also a member of several background communities. The foreground and background order are the same as in the experiment of Section IV-A2, and sparsity levels all log N i /N i . The foreground network is only a small fraction of the entire population. Foreground actors are characterized by two distinct lifestyles representing their memberships in the covert community as well as different background communities. The background communities are intended to represent various business, home, industry, religious, sports, or other social interactions. Fig. 5 illustrates the ROC performance with these parameters, varying the level of foreground coordination. Through Eq. (44), space-time threat propagation is designed to perform well with highly coordinated networks, consistent with the results observed in Fig. 5 in which STTP performs best at the higher coordination levels and outperforms the breadthfirst search and modularity-based spectral detection methods. The spectral detection algorithm is expected to perform poorly in this scenario because, as discussed in Section II-B, it relies upon a relatively dense foreground network, which does not exist in this simulated dataset with realistic properties of covert networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A Bayesian framework for network detection can be used to unify the different approaches of network detection algorithms based on random walks/diffusion and algorithms based on spectral properties. Indeed, using the concise assumptions for random walks and threat propagation laid out in Definition 6, all the theoretical results follow immediately, including the proof of equivalence, an exact, closed-form, efficient solution, and Neyman-Pearson optimality. Not only is this theoretically appealing, but it provides direct practical benefits through a new network detection algorithm called space-time threat propagation, that is shown to achieve superior performance with simulated covert networks. Bayesian space-time threat propagation is interpreted both as a random walk on a graph and, equivalently, as the solution to a harmonic boundary value problem. Bayes' rule determines the unknown probability of threat on the uncued nodes-the "interior"-based on threat observations at cue nodes-the "boundary." Hybrid threat propagation algorithms appropriate for heterogeneous spatiotemporal relationships can be obtained from this general threat diffusion model. This new method is compared to well-known spectral methods by examining competing notions of network detection optimality. To model realistic covert networks realistically embedded within realistic backgrounds, a new hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel based on mixed membership of random graphs is introduced and used to assess algorithm detection performance on graphs with varying activity and coordination. In the important situations of low foreground activity with varying levels of coordination, the examples show the superior detection performance of Bayesian space-time threat propagation compared to other spatial-only and uncued spectral methods.
